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"Fall Cases on Hot-Button Issues
May Hinge on the New Justice"
Washington Post
July 5, 2005
Charles Lane
Abortion. Physician-assisted suicide. Gay
rights. How will the Supreme Court handle
those issues without Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, the centrist swing voter who
announced her retirement from the court last
week after a 24-year tenure?
Actually, it probably won't take long to find
out. The abortion rights of teenagers,
administration efforts to override a state
right-to-die law, and the military's "don't
ask, don't tell" policy are all on the docket
for the court term that begins Oct. 3.
O'Connor's past opinions show that she
would have played a pivotal role in these
cases. Now, their outcome may hinge on the
views of her successor. Learning those
views may prove challenging to senators, if
a nominee adheres to the practice of not
answering questions about matters that are,
or soon will be, before the court.
"One of the fascinating dances in the
confirmation process is going to be how
much you can get a nominee to answer, even
about relatively recent precedents, when the
issues are presented in cases that are
pending on the docket," said Douglas W.
Kmiec, a professor of constitutional law at
Pepperdine University.
The retirement of O'Connor, who often cast
the deciding vote in the court's cases, could
portend great change at the court, especially
if President Bush replaces her with a
steadfastly conservative nominee, as many
expect.
If O'Connor's career teaches anything, it is
that a justice's initial votes on the court are
not necessarily a reliable guide to what that
justice will do in the course of a long, life-
tenured career. In her first years, she leaned
heavily against abortion and affirmative
action, only to tack in the other direction
later.
Even if O'Connor were replaced by a
conservative opponent of Roe v. Wade, the
1973 ruling recognizing a right to abortion,
Roe would still have the support of a five-
justice majority. Any challenge to its core
holding would take years to bubble up from
lower courts.
Still, next term will present O'Connor's
successor with a chance to answer important
questions about the scope of Roe as well as
other precedents.
For example, a 1992 Supreme Court
decision, co-written by O'Connor, set forth a
test for the constitutionality of state abortion
regulations, saying they must not impose an
"undue burden" on exercising the right to
abortion.
The court defined an undue burden as a law
that "in a large fraction of cases" puts a
"substantial obstacle" in the way of someone
seeking an abortion.
At the same time, the court has said that
states may pass laws requiring minors to
notify their parents of plans to terminate a
pregnancy, as long as they permit minors to
seek a court's permission when informing
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their parents is impossible or dangerous.
The court has never clarified whether
O'Connor's "undue burden" test means that
parental-notification laws, which are on the
books in 33 states, must include an explicit
exception for cases in which the pregnant
girl's health is at risk.
But in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, No.
04-1144, which is to be argued in December
and decided by mid-2006, the court will rule
on a New Hampshire law that has no health
exception. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 1st Circuit, based in Boston, ruled last
year that the New Hampshire law is
unconstitutional and cannot go into effect.
In its appeal, however, New Hampshire said
the 1st Circuit applied the wrong legal
standard. It cited a 1987 Supreme Court
ruling that suggests opponents of the law
must show that the law would limit abortion
rights not just in some or most cases but in
all cases.
If the justices affirm the ruling of the 1st
Circuit, striking down the law, the effect
will be to fortify and entrench Supreme
Court precedents on abortion rights. If the
court rules in favor of New Hampshire law,
it will open the door to other states to adopt
similar legislation.
Any elucidation of the court's view of its
doctrine of a health exception could also
affect the federal ban on the procedure
critics call "partial birth" abortion. Enacted
by Congress with Bush's support in 2003, it
included no exception to protect the
woman's health. But three district courts
have found it unconstitutional under a 5 to 4
Supreme Court ruling in 2000, joined by
O'Connor, that said such bans must include
a health exception.
The government's appeals are pending, and
conflicting decisions by appeals courts could
lead to a Supreme Court case in the early
years of O'Connor's successor.
In October, physician-assisted suicide will
be before the court in Gonzales v. Oregon,
No. 04-623. The administration has
appealed a lower court's order barring the
Justice Department from taking away the
prescribing rights of Oregon doctors who
prescribe lethal doses of drugs to terminally
ill patients who have chosen to die under
that state's 11-year-old Death With Dignity
Act.
Assisted suicide is an intensely emotional
issue, both for advocates of a "right to die,"
who see it as many people's only means of a
dignified death, and for conservative
Christians, who see it as a form of murder.
Opposition to laws such as Oregon's was a
favorite cause of former attorney general
John D. Ashcroft, who issued a November
2001 directive determining that assisting
suicide is not a "legitimate medical purpose"
under federal drug-control law-and that the
Drug Enforcement Administration could act
against any physician who authorized drugs
to help someone die.
The directive overturned a 1998 decision by
President Bill Clinton's attorney general,
Janet Reno, that permitted Oregon doctors to
assist in suicides.
Strictly speaking, the case does not involve
any assertion of a constitutionally protected
right to die. The court unanimously refused
to recognize such a right in 1997, ruling that
it should be left to the states to determine
whether legalized assisted suicide is wise
policy.
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Rather, the case is framed by the parties as a
clash between federal power to regulate
drugs and states' power to regulate the
practice of medicine.
But the practical effect of the Ashcroft
directive is to make Oregon's law a dead
letter-and O'Connor might have been
sympathetic to Oregon. She vigorously
dissented from the court's 6 to 3 ruling last
month in which it upheld a federal override
of California's medical marijuana law. In
the 1997 case, Washington v. Glucksberg,
the court was ruling on state bans on assisted
suicide. O'Connor was one of five justices
who wrote or signed concurring opinions
implying that they might not strike down a
state law such as the Oregon one that
permits assisted suicide.
"Death will be different for each of us," she
wrote. "For many the last days will be spent
in physical pain . . . some will seek
medication to alleviate that pain and other
symptoms."
In Rumsfeld v. FAIR, No. 04-1152, to be
argued in November, the question is whether
some law schools may curb military
recruiters' access to their students in protest
of the U.S. armed forces' ban on openly gay
members.
The court is being asked to rule on the
constitutionality of the Solomon
Amendment, a federal law that requires
universities to give military recruiters equal
access or risk millions of dollars in federal
funding.
Legal analysts generally expect a win for the
government, but the case will create a high-
profile forum in which both opponents and
supporters of the "don't ask, don't tell"
policy can fight out this particular battle of
the culture wars.
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"Supreme Modesty"
New York Times
July 24, 2005
Jeffrey Rosen
At the moment, liberals are afraid, very
afraid. They fear that two Supreme Court
appointments by President Bush could
transform America for decades to come.
And they fear that President Bush will
accomplish this transformation by replacing
Sandra Day O'Connor and, eventually,
William Rehnquist with hard-core
conservatives in the mode of Antonin Scalia
and Clarence Thomas. A hypothetical worst
case for liberals might be a multicultural
twofer: the appointment of Judge Janice
Rogers Brown, an African-American
libertarian who makes Thomas look mild,
and Attorney General Alberto Gonzales,
who may well surprise his right-wing critics
by becoming a reliable conservative on the
bench.
But even if the court is, in fact, transformed,
the consequences might be far less severe
than liberals imagine. To begin with, most
of America's legal business does not involve
the court at all. The justices decide very few
cases-an average of only 82 a year during
the past 10 years-and most of them are not
politically divisive. Between 1994 and
2003, 36 percent of the court's opinions
were unanimous, as opposed to only 21
percent that were decided by a 5-4 vote.
What's more, if the Supreme Court
overruled Roe v. Wade or its school-prayer
decisions tomorrow, abortion wouldn't
become illegal across America, and prayer
wouldn't become mandatory. Instead, the
states and Congress would have the power
to regulate abortion or to allow prayer if
they chose to do so. That means that the
most controversial questions in American
life would ultimately be settled in the court
of public opinion, regardless of what the
Supreme Court says.
Of course, some of the court's closest
decisions involve hot-button issues, and they
could indeed go the other way if the new
justices follow in the path of Scalia and
Thomas. The most immediate change might
involve affirmative action: two years ago,
O'Connor wrote a 5-4 majority opinion
upholding affirmative action in law-school
admissions; her successor might tilt the
court in the opposite direction. But even if
the court voted to strike down affirmative
action in higher education, it is hardly
obvious that affirmative action would end in
a dramatic stroke. When the court, with
O'Connor's blessing, questioned the
constitutionality of affirmative action in
public contracting in 1995, political support
for affirmative action in the Clinton and
Bush administrations and in Congress
ensured that many federal contracting set-
asides continued anyway, with only slight
revisions.
The ultimate liberal nightmare is that the
new Bush court might overturn Roe v.
Wade. But if Rehnquist retires next, Bush
will need three Supreme Court
appointments, not two, to overturn Roe. For
the sake of playing out the liberal nightmare,
however, imagine that Roe, in fact, was
overturned. The world still wouldn't come
to an end for liberals. Since two-thirds of
Americans in polls have long said that
abortion should be legal during the first
three months of pregnancy, only the most
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conservative states-Louisiana and Utah,
for example-might try to pass new
restrictions on early-term abortions. And in
the event that a handful of states succeed in
passing new early-term bans, or reviving old
ones, the national backlash could split the
G.O.P. apart at the seams, causing sizable
numbers of pro-choice Republicans to desert
their party. Karl Rove understands this, and
when asked whether Roe should be
overturned, he has dodged the question.
The fact that Bush may need three Supreme
Court appointments to overturn Roe (and to
resurrect school prayer) suggests that
liberals should keep some of their powder
dry for the truly defining battle over the
court, which will occur if and when a liberal
justice retires. But what if Bush gets three
retirements and manages to appoint three
Clarence Thomas epigones to the court?
Thomas is the court's most radical justice,
and if his views prevailed, environmental
laws might be struck down, and the states,
no longer bound by the First Amendment's
prohibition on establishment of religion,
might be free to re-establish
congregationalism as an official religion.
(I'm not making this up.) But of course, the
chances that any state would actually try to
re-establish the Congregational Church are
nil. And if the court tried to dismantle the
Environmental Protection Agency, even a
Republican Congress might rise up in
protest, prompting an eventual judicial
retreat. Throughout American history, the
court has been notoriously ineffective when
it has tried to impose the views of a minority
over the determined objections of a national
majority.
I don't mean to minimize the importance of
the immediate Supreme Court nomination
on the horizon, which may indeed transform
the law on everything from campaign
finance to the detention of immigrants. But
nightmares aside, the most immediate effect
of two more conservative appointments may
be to make Anthony Kennedy the new
swing justice, and like a polarized molecule,
he might react to his new colleagues by
moving a little further to the left. On the
new Bush court, though, it's unlikely that
Kennedy would be able to satisfy liberals by
creating new rights, even if he wanted to.
But that may be yet another blessing in
disguise for liberals. After all, Kennedy's
decision striking down sodomy laws in the
name of sexual freedom angered and
alienated social conservatives and may have
increased their political clout. The court is
far from all-powerful and all-determining.
And for this reason, it may be unwise for
liberals to spend tens of millions of dollars
to fight largely symbolic Supreme Court
confirmation battles that they will probably
lose in the end. Instead, they should be
preparing legislative campaigns to protect
abortion rights and religious neutrality and
devoting their energies to recapturing the
two branches that really govern America:
namely, the White House and Congress.
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"Court's Term a Turn Back to the Center"
New York Times
July 4, 2005
Linda Greenhouse
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's unexpected
retirement announcement last week shifted
public attention toward her legacy and the
Supreme Court's future and away from the
term that just concluded. But the term-
apparently not the Rehnquist Court's last,
after all-contained its share of notable
developments that, taken together, cast a
shadow of ambiguity over Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist's legacy.
The court's federalism revolution stalled,
while the revival of property rights, which
appeared to be taking off not long ago,
crashed and burned on a riverbank in New
London, Conn.
The court displayed a growing concern
about the death penalty, with the majority
suggesting that lower courts had taken the
Supreme Court's impatience with prolonged
appeals too far toward short-circuiting
defendants' rights. The justices also gave
broad interpretations to three federal anti-
discrimination laws.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer displaced Justice
O'Connor at the court's center of gravity,
casting the fewest dissenting votes-10, to
Justice O'Connor's 11-in the 74 cases that
were decided with full opinions.
As the Rehnquist Court ended a 19th year
and appeared poised, unexpectedly, to begin
a 20th, it was almost as if a constitutional
centripetal force had been at work in recent
years, pulling the court back toward the
middle in many areas of its docket,
including federalism, affirmative action,
religion and abortion. The result frustrated
conservatives and raised the stakes for the
appointment of Justice O'Connor's
successor.
The court's six discrimination cases from
this past term provide an example. Three
were brought under the Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection, and the others
required an interpretation of three different
federal statutes.
In all six cases, with Justice O'Connor in the
majority in four, the court adopted a broader
reading of the relevant provision, not
necessarily handing victory to the particular
individuals but keeping avenues of legal
redress open for the future.
Beyond these case-specific trends,
voting patterns this term were unusual.
the
In recent terms, the five most conservative
members of the court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justices
Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy and
Clarence Thomas, displayed a striking
degree of cohesion. They voted together,
for example, in half of the 18 5-to-4
decisions in the 2003-2004 term. In the past
five terms, their alliance in the most closely
divided cases ranged from a low of just over
one-third of the cases in one term to a high
of 70 percent of them in another.
But in the latest term, which began Oct. 4
and ended June 27, the five voted together in
only 18 percent of the cases decided by five-
member majorities, 4 out of 22. (Four of the
22 cases were decided by votes of 5 to 3,
with the chief justice not participating.)
543
Although theories were available to explain
votes that looked anomalous, some of the
alignments turned heads. For example,
Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined Justice
Breyer and Justices John Paul Stevens,
David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg
to reject the states' rights position in the
California medical marijuana case. Justice
Breyer provided the crucial fifth vote for
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion upholding
the Ten Commandments monument on the
grounds of the Texas State Capitol.
In 48 split decisions this past term, Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer, President Bill
Clinton's two Supreme Court appointments
(and the only two current justices to have
been appointed by a Democratic president),
were on opposite sides in 11. Justices Scalia
and Thomas, who are often mistakenly
viewed as ideologically inseparable, were on
opposite sides in 12.
After their 11 years together, what has
gotten into these nine justices?
Nelson Lund of the George Mason
University School of Law, who was a law
clerk for Justice O'Connor during the court's
1987 term, said in an interview that there
was a tendency to blame her for outcomes
that have disappointed Professor Lund's
fellow conservatives. "But the easy
explanations are not quite adequate," he
said.
Pointing out that courts proceed
incrementally, informed by precedent and by
the facts of each case, Professor Lund
continued: "There is a deep current of
common-law thinking that pervades our
legal system. Our courts rarely make a lot
of big lurches. Usually when they make a
big step, it's because people didn't realize
how big a step it was, and then they pull
back."
Kathleen M. Sullivan, a liberal legal scholar
and former dean of Stanford Law School,
offered a similar observation. The court's
recent behavior may be "as much
psychological as jurisprudential," she said in
an interview.
Professor Sullivan said some of the term's
more surprising outcomes may reflect the
fact that the Supreme Court, its membership
stable while the lower federal courts have
had considerable turnover, is now by some
measures to the left of some of the federal
appeals courts.
She said some justices may have been
alarmed to find that the appeals courts were
carrying their opinions further than intended
or were applying them in unanticipated
ways. This, in turn, may explain why in
several decisions this year, including rulings
for defendants in death penalty cases, the
Supreme Court did not articulate new legal
principles so much as correct what it saw as
erroneous lower court opinions, a role it
usually avoids. "The middle justices have
seen themselves as guardians of the court's
integrity even at the price of inconsistency,"
Professor Sullivan said.
The term was something of a triumph for
Justice Stevens, the longest-serving
associate justice and a vigorous 85-year-old
who has no plans to retire; in fact, this week
he is interviewing applicants for clerkships
for the court's term that begins in October
2006.
Of his several major opinions, by far the
sweetest for him must have been his
majority opinion in Gonzales v. Raich,
declaring that federal authority trumped
California's medical marijuana initiative.
Justice Stevens, a Republican named to the
court by President Gerald Ford and now
arguably the most liberal justice, has been
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adamant in resisting the states' rights tilt of
the court in a series of federalism cases. le
also wrote for the majority in the eminent
domain case, Kelo v. City of New London,
and in an important age discrimination case,
Smith v. City of Jackson.
Justice Stevens filed one particularly notable
dissenting opinion during the term, in a case
that prohibited states from discriminating
against out-of-state wineries. In Justice
Stevens' view, the intent of the 21st
Amendment, adopted in 1933, was to give
states free rein in regulating alcohol use and
commerce within their borders. To support
his argument, he drew on a resource no
other justice had available: a memory of the
repeal of Prohibition. "My understanding
(and recollection) of the historical context
reinforces my conviction" about the meaning
of the amendment, he said.
Course corrections were made by justices
across the ideological spectrum, even in
areas of the docket not usually seen as
lightning rods. For example, the court
upheld the federal beef marketing program
that finances the "Beef, it's what's for
dinner" advertising campaign through
assessments on cattle producers, even on
those who object to paying.
A Supreme Court decision fours years
earlier had found that a similar program
amounted to compelled speech in violation
of the First Amendment. The decision used
language that, if taken to a logical
conclusion, suggested a new constitutional
basis for attacking a range of government
programs, even taxation.
So in an opinion by Justice Scalia, who had
joined the earlier decision, the court tacked
back, shutting the door on that First
Amendment theory before it could gain
momentum. Chief Justice Rehnquist also
changed sides.
In the constant dynamic of stability and
change inside the court, justices find
different comfort levels. With Justice
O'Connor's departure, change will now
come, for the first time in II years, from
outside the court as well.
Criminal Law and Sentencing
The court's continuing re-examination of the
respective roles of judges and juries in
criminal sentencing produced a
transformation in federal guidelines.
The decision in United States v. Booker, No.
04-104, was really two separate 5-to-4
opinions supported by two different
coalitions of justices. First, Justices
Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas and
Ginsburg held that the federal sentencing
guidelines were unconstitutional because
they gave judges power that, under the Sixth
Amendment's right to a trial by jury,
belonged to the jurors-namely, the power
to make the factual findings that determine
the sentence.
A second coalition, composed of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Breyer,
Kennedy, O'Connor and Ginsburg, then
ruled that the problem could be fixed by
making the guidelines advisory rather than
mandatory, restoring to federal judges some
of the discretion that Congress had taken
away 21 years earlier.
In another case, the court ruled 5 to 4 that
the Constitution categorically bars capital
punishment for crimes committed before the
age of 18. Justice Kennedy's opinion in the
case, Roper v. Simmons, No. 03-633,
overturned a 1989 precedent that had set the
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age at 16. The Roper decision also
concluded that the American public, as well
as the world, had turned against the death
penalty for juveniles. Justices Scalia,
Thomas and O'Connor dissented, along with
Chief Justice Rehnquist.
For only the third time in 20 years, the court
overturned a death sentence on the ground
that the defendant had received a
constitutionally inadequate defense. Justice
Souter's 5-to-4 opinion in Rompilla i'.
Beard, No. 04-5462, was joined by Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer and O'Connor.
In Deck v. Missouri, No. 04-5293, the court
ruled 7 to 2 that it is unconstitutional to use
shackles to restrain a prisoner during a death
penalty sentencing hearing unless there is a
particular reason for doing so. Justice
Breyer said for the majority that shackling
was inherently prejudicial and required
"adequate justification." Justices Thomas
and Scalia dissented.
The court also ruled that in making a routine
traffic stop, the police can allow a trained
dog to sniff the car for drugs without the
need for any particular suspicion of a
narcotics violation. Justices Souter and
Ginsburg dissented in the case, Illinois v.
Caballes, No. 03-923, and the chief justice
did not vote.
In Castle Rock v. Gonzales, No. 04-278, the
court held that the police do not have a
constitutional duty to enforce a court-issued
domestic order of protection. The 7-to-2
decision overturned an appeals court ruling
that allowed a woman to sue a Colorado
police department for failing to take action
after her estranged husband violated a
restraining order by kidnapping their three
daughters, whom he then murdered.
The mandatory arrest language on the order
could not displace the police department's
ordinary exercise of discretion, the court
held in an opinion by Justice Scalia, over the
dissenting votes of Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg.
Property Rights
In what was perhaps the term's most
disputed decision, the court ruled that
fostering economic development is an
appropriate use of the government's power
of eminent domain. The 5-to-4 decision in
Kelo v. City of New London, No. 04-108,
upheld a plan in the economically depressed
Connecticut city to replace an old residential
neighborhood with office space and a
conference hotel. The majority opinion by
Justice Stevens was joined by Justices
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.
The court also unanimously upheld Hawaii's
rent-control law for gasoline stations,
rejecting the oil companies' argument that
limiting their rate of return amounted to an
unconstitutional "taking" of private property.
The case was Lingle v. Chevron US.A. Inc.,
No. 04-163.
Religion
Two decisions on government display of the
Ten Commandments looked in opposite
directions, with only Justice Breyer joining
the majority in each of the 5-to-4 rulings.
In Van Orden v. Perry, No. 03-1500, the
court found that the display of a six-foot-
high Ten Commandments monument on the
grounds of the Texas State Capitol did not
amount to an unconstitutional
"establishment" of religion. Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote the opinion, joined by
Justices Breyer, Kennedy, Scalia and
Thomas.
In McCreary County v. American Civil
Liberties Union, No. 03-1693, the court held
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that the framed display of the Ten
Commandments on the walls of two
Kentucky county courthouses, although
surrounded by other texts of historical
interest and secular content, was
unconstitutional. Justices Souter, O'Connor,
Ginsburg and Stevens, along with Justice
Breyer, voted in the majority.
Also, the court ruled unanimously that a new
federal law, the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, does not
violate the separation of church and state in
requiring prison officials to meet inmates'
religious needs. Justice Ginsburg's opinion
in Cutter v. Wilkinson, No. 03-9877,
warned, however, that prison security
remained a 'compelling state interest" and
that demonstrated problems in
accommodating inmates' requests would be
resolved in favor of prison officials.
Discrimination
The federal law that bars sex discrimination
in schools and colleges also prohibits school
officials from retaliating against those who
bring complaints of such discrimination, the
court ruled in Jackson v. Birmingham Board
of Education, No. 02-1672. The 5-to-4
decision expanded the scope of the law
known as Title IX to include protection for
whistle-blowers. Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion was joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.
Also, employees who sue for age
discrimination do not have to prove that the
discrimination was intentional, the court
ruled. The 5-to-3 decision in Smith v. City
ofJackson, No. 03-1160, applied to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, the
"disparate impact" theory of liability long
familiar under the laws against race and sex
discrimination. Employees need not
produce a smoking gun, but can win by
showing that a policy has the effect of
discriminating against older workers,
regardless of an employer's motivation. The
dissenters were Justices Thomas, Kennedy,
and O'Connor. Chief Justice Rehnquist did
not participate.
In Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.,
No. 03-1388, the court ruled 6 to 3 that the
Americans With Disabilities Act protects the
rights of passengers who sail on cruise ships
that call at American ports, even ships that
fly under foreign flags, as most do.
However, ships will not be required to make
major structural alterations. The dissenters
were Justices Scalia and O'Connor and
Chief Justice Rehnquist.
The court also overturned a 20-year-old
murder conviction in Texas on the ground
that the jury selection had been infected by
racial discrimination. The 6-to-3 decision in
Miller-El v. Dretke, No. 03-9659, was the
court's second ruling on behalf of the death
row inmate, Thomas Miller-El. The
dissenters were Justices Thomas and Scalia
and Chief Justice Rehnquist.
In another case, the court ruled that a
California prison policy that temporarily
segregates new or newly transferred inmates
by race, for the stated purpose of preventing
gang violence, was constitutionally suspect
and not entitled to the judicial deference that
is usually accorded to prison administration
policies. The vote in Johnson v. California,
No. 03-636, was 5 to 3, with Chief Justice
Rehnquist not participating. Justice Stevens
said in his dissent that the policy was flatly
unconstitutional. Justices Scalia and
Thomas, dissenting on different grounds,
said the court should have deferred to prison
officials.
Federalism
Reasserting federal authority, the court
upheld the power of Congress to prohibit
and prosecute the possession and use of
marijuana, even in California and the 10
other states that allowed it for medical
purposes. A federal appeals court had ruled
that the noncommercial cultivation and use
of marijuana that did not cross state lines fell
outside Congress's constitutional authority
to regulate interstate commerce.
The vote in Gonzales v. Raich, No. 03-1454,
was 6 to 3. The surprise was not that
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, and
Breyer voted with the majority, but that
Justices Kennedy and Scalia defected from
their usual states' rights allies to vote to
uphold federal power.
Rejecting state protectionism in the national
wine market, the court overturned liquor
laws in New York and Michigan and ruled
that states that allow in-state wineries to ship
directly to consumers must give the same
privilege to out-of-state wineries. The vote
in Granholm v. Heald, No. 03-1116, was 5
to 4, with Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Souter,
Ginsburg and Breyer in the majority.
The court rejected a claim of federal pre-
emption and allowed suits to go forward in
state court claiming negligence in the design
and manufacture of pesticides and
herbicides. These products are regulated
under a federal law, the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, and the
Bush administration had argued that this
statute, which does not allow private
lawsuits in federal court, also implicitly
blocked the states from opening their courts
to such suits. The vote in Bates v. Dow
AgroSciences L.L.C., No. 03-388, was 7 to
2, with Justices Thomas and Scalia
dissenting.
Immigration
The court ruled unanimously that driving
under the influence of alcohol, even when
serious injury results, is not a "crime of
violence" for which an immigrant should
face automatic deportation. Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote the opinion in Leocal v.
Ashcroft, No. 03-583, which rejected the
Bush administration's interpretation of
federal immigration law.
Meanwhile, Cubans who entered the United
States during the Mariel boatlift in 1980 and
subsequently committed crimes cannot be
subjected to open-ended detention, the court
ruled in a 7-to-2 decision. Although these
Cubans, as many as 1,000 of the 125,000
who arrived in the boatlift, are now
deportable, Cuba will not take them back.
They may not be held for more than six
months without a special reason, Justice
Scalia said for the court in Clark v.
Martinez, No. 03-878. Justice Thomas and
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented.
Immigrants from Somalia may be deported
despite the lack of a centrally functioning
government in Somalia to receive them, the
court ruled 5 to 4 in Jama v. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, No. 03-674. The
dissenters were Justices Souter, Stevens,
Ginsburg and Breyer.
Business
The court unanimously overturned the
criminal conviction of the accounting firm
Arthur Andersen for shredding documents
related to its work for Enron as that
company was collapsing in 2001. Chief
Justice Rehnquist said for the majority in
Arthur Andersen v. United States, No. 04-
368, that the judge's instructions to the jury
failed to require the necessary proof that the
firm knew its actions were wrong. The
victory came too late for Andersen, which
lost its clients and its licenses and now has
200 employees, down from 28,000,
wrapping up the firm's affairs.
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In another unanimous opinion, the court
reinstated a copyright-infringement suit by
Hollywood studios and the music industry
against two file-sharing services whose
software enables users to download
copyrighted movies and songs.
Overturning an appeals court ruling in favor
of the services, Grokster and StreamCast
Networks, the court held that a company
shown to induce copyright infringement can
be liable even if its products also have
lawful uses. While sending the case, Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster Ltd.,
No. 04-480, back to the lower courts, the
justices made it clear that they believed the
plaintiffs had presented ample evidence of
inducement.
Upholding an interpretation by the Federal
Communications Commission, the court
ruled that cable companies do not have to
allow rivals to offer high-speed Internet
access over their systems. The 6-to-3
decision in National Cable &
Telecommunications Association v. Brand X
Internet Services, No. 04-277, was a victory
for cable in the competition to provide
broadband service. Justices Scalia, Souter
and Ginsburg dissented.
In another case, the court ruled unanimously
that federal bankruptcy law shields
individual retirement accounts from
creditors. The decision in Rousey v.
Jacoway, No. 03-1407, extended the
protection already provided to 401(k)
accounts and company pension plans.
The court also raised the bar for investors
bringing securities fraud cases. The mere
accusation that a company's
misrepresentations inflated the stock price is
an insufficient basis for a suit, the court
ruled unanimously in Dura Pharmaceuticals
Inc. v. Broudo, No. 03-932. Instead,
investors must claim at the outset that it was
the artificially high stock price that actually
caused their losses.
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"A Season of Dissent for the Chief Justice"
USA Today
June 29, 2005
Joan Biskupic
WASHINGTON-For Chief Justice
William Rehnquist, it was a Supreme Court
term that began with a battle with thyroid
cancer that left his body frail and his voice
raspy. By the end of the 2004-05 term
Monday, it also was clear that Rehnquist's
voice had been diminished on some of the
nation's most contentious issues.
In a dozen key rulings during the term, the
conservative chief justice voted in the
minority.
When five of the nine justices voted to ban
executions of defendants who were juveniles
at the time of their crimes, Rehnquist
dissented. In a ruling that allowed
governments to use their eminent domain
powers to seize homes for private
development, he dissented.
The decision that said state "medical
marijuana" laws don't protect users from
federal prosecution? Rehnquist dissented.
The ruling that expanded the types of
lawsuits that may be filed under the Title IX
law that bars sex discrimination in school
programs? Rehnquist dissented. The
decision that states could not stop their
residents from receiving direct shipments of
wine from out-of-state vineyards? Another
dissent by Rehnquist.
When Rehnquist disagreed with the
majority, he did not level any fiery dissents,
as he had done in the past. He wrote only
one dissent all term, in a tax law case.
Otherwise, when he disagreed with the
majority he simply signed on to another
dissenting justice's statement.
That was particularly evident last week,
when he disagreed with the court's ruling in
Kelo v. City of New London, the Connecticut
property rights case that tested governments'
powers of eminent domain.
In prior terms, Rehnquist had taken the lead
in trying to boost legal protections for
property owners, saying that governments
increasingly were encroaching on their
rights. Rather than write up such sentiment,
Rehnquist joined an opinion by Sandra Day
O'Connor. Her dissent was
uncharacteristically biting. She warned that
"under the banner of economic
development, all private property is now
vulnerable to being taken" by local
governments.
"That's a case that will be remembered by
the average person on the street," says
Theodore Olson, a former U.S. solicitor
general.
The ruling is drawing fire on Capitol Hill.
House Majority Leader Tom DeLay, R-
Texas, harshly criticized it Tuesday during a
session with reporters. He accused the
court's majority of "shredding private
property rights."
Still a conservative court
The Rehnquist court remains generally
cautious and conservative, however, and
Rehnquist's recent losses do not significantly
diminish the overall legacy he has built in 33
years on the court, 19 of them as chief
justice. He had a leading role in the move
away from the lingering liberalism of the
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court led by Earl Warren from 1953 to 1969.
Nowadays, the court is holding steady,
rather than accelerating the march to the
right that Rehnquist led in the 1990s. In a
few significant areas this term, it even
moved to the left. The new ban on
executions for defendants who were under
18 at the time of their crimes reversed a
court stance from 1989.
In all, the justices invalidated five death
sentences. For only the third time in 20
years, the court reversed a death sentence
because a defendant had an incompetent
lawyer. The actions on the death penalty
indicated a desire among several justices to
ensure that capital punishment is reserved
for defendants who have had sufficient
counsel and been guaranteed due process.
Monday's rulings regarding government
displays of the Ten Commandments marked
a more subtle shift to the left. In one ruling,
Justice David Souter said the
Commandments could be posted in certain
settings. But the liberal-leaning majority-
Souter, John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and O'Connor-
put a new emphasis on the motives of local
officials who want to exhibit religious
symbols. That's likely to make it more
difficult in the future for local officials to
respond to constituent pleas for Ten
Commandments displays on public property.
The court resolved several business cases,
including a 9-0 ruling Monday that said
Internet file-sharing services can be held
liable if they encourage their customers to
swap songs and movies illegally. In a
unanimous opinion written by Rehnquist,
the court also threw out an obstruction-of-
justice conviction against Arthur Andersen,
the accounting firm that kept the books for
the failed energy trader Enron. The court
said the instructions to the jury were flawed.
By a closer vote, 5-3, the justices said older
workers may sue employers over pay or
benefit plans that favor younger employees,
even if no evidence of deliberate age bias
exists. Rehnquist did not participate in the
case while he was being treated for cancer in
November. He sat out of 11 of the court's
80 decisions this term.
"On the whole, business interests did not
fare as well as they usually do this term,"
said Maureen Mahoney, who represented
Arthur Andersen. She called the Andersen
ruling a "bright spot" but said that
"elsewhere, the court increased the cost of
doing business by expanding the availability
of damage remedies in some closely divided
opinions under the civil rights laws."
Health questions
Questions about Rehnquist's health-and
whether he would retire to create the first
opening on the bench in 11 years-hung
over the court throughout the term.
Rehnquist has not said whether he is
leaving, but the Bush administration already
has interviewed several potential successors.
Rehnquist, who underwent chemotherapy
and the insertion of a tracheotomy tube to
ease his breathing, missed four months of
oral arguments but participated by reading
briefs and reviewing transcripts of the oral
arguments. When he returned to the bench
in March, he appeared weak and his
breathing was labored.
It's likely a coincidence that Rehnquist's
illness occurred during a term in which he
dissented so frequently in major cases. In
recent years, the liberal wing led by Stevens
has won a few key cases, on affirmative
action and gay rights, for example. Further,
O'Connor and Justice Anthony Kennedy
have for several terms proven to be less
reliably conservative than they were in the
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late 1980s and 1990s.
On Monday, Rehnquist closed the session
by announcing that the court would be in
recess until Oct.3. In his last remarks from
the bench-perhaps just for the term,
perhaps forever-Rehnquist expressed his
appreciation to the court staff. He said it
had been an unusual term, and then he noted
that the court's marble building is
undergoing a renovation. That has caused
some justices' offices to be moved and
landed court staff members in trailers.
Rehnquist did not mention his own situation.
He got out of his black leather chair and-
with O'Connor and Stevens at his side,
watching to see if he needed a hand-he
slowly made his way through the crimson
velvet drapes, and out of public view.
Contributing: Jim Drinkard
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"In Other News from the Middle,
Some Shifts by Justice Kennedy"
Washington Post
July 4, 2005
Charles Lane
All eyes were on Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor after the Supreme Court wrapped
up its term this week.
But while O'Connor and her centrist legacy
may have been at the center of attention
because of her surprise retirement
announcement Friday, the center of power
during the term was one chair to her left,
where Justice Anthony M. Kennedy-the
court's other center-right swing voter-sits.
In three crucial cases this term, Kennedy, a
1988 appointee of President Ronald Reagan,
defected from the five-member right-of-
center bloc that Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist nominally leads.
Kennedy joined with the court's liberals to
abolish the death penalty for juvenile
offenders, to give local governments a green
light to take private property for economic
development and to endorse a broad theory
of federal regulatory power that denied
states the right to override a federal law
against homegrown medical marijuana.
O'Connor actually found herself in dissent in
most of the court's big cases last term,
voting to uphold the juvenile death penalty,
to strike down Texas's display of the Ten
Commandments, to forbid takings of private
property for economic development and to
uphold California's right to pass a medical
marijuana law.
And she expressed that dissent in what was,
for her, an unusually uncompromising tone;
she seemed uninterested in keeping her
options open for future cases, as she often
did in the past.
In the marijuana case, for example, she
accused the majority of "threaten[ing] to
sweep all of productive human activity into
federal regulatory reach."
In hindsight, this may have been a clue to
her plans to retire. Referring to the property
rights case, Richard J. Lazarus, a professor
of law at Georgetown University, noted that
it was very uncharacteristic of O'Connor. "It
didn't read like an O'Connor opinion," he
said. "It made me think she was in a
different frame of mind."
For Kennedy's part, not only did he desert
the conservative camp on crucial issues, he
did so in spite of his past votes and writings
on the court, which suggested that he might
have come out the other way each time.
"What's up with Justice Kennedy?" Boston
University law professor Randy Barnett
asked at a forum on the recently concluded
term sponsored by the American
Constitution Society last week. "He's
clearly crossed some kind of a Rubicon.
That's the big news of this term."
Kennedy's rulings further angered
conservative activists who were already
upset with him because of his authorship of
the court's opinion last year abolishing state
laws against same-sex sodomy.
In a generally disappointing term for the
right, some conservatives said the only
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bright spot in the court's Kennedy-supported
leftward movement was that it will help
them rally their base to urge President Bush
to put a committed conservative on the
court.
"As grievous as some of the rulings are,"
said Jan LaRue, chief counsel of Concerned
Women for America, a conservative group
that focuses on social issues, "they have the
good effect of awakening more Americans
to how important each vote on the court is."
There could be two vacancies to fill if
Rehnquist, 80 and suffering from thyroid
cancer, follows his old friend O'Connor into
retirement.
Rehnquist seemed frail last Monday and
struggled to speak clearly through a special
valve in his throat where doctors performed
surgery in October to help him breathe. He
seemed in good spirits, however, cracking a
joke about the lengthy list of dissenting and
concurring opinions in one case.
Rehnquist was being a good sport at the end
of a term in which his influence seemed to
ebb along with his physical health.
Of the 24 cases decided by a vote of 5 to 4,
the conservative coalition of Rehnquist,
O'Connor, Kennedy, Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas held together in only five,
according to statistics compiled by the law
firm Goldstein & Howe.
In the previous two terms, the conservative
majority had held together in almost half of
the 5 to 4 cases, the firm said.
Capital punishment, property rights, state
sovereignty and more latitude for official
expressions of religious sentiment have all
been pet causes of the chief justice in his 33
years on the court. He has helped move the
court to the right on each of these issues
during the past decade-but found himself
mostly in dissent on them this term.
Kennedy was the difference-maker in the
death penalty case, writing the opinion for a
five-member majority that found the country
had formed a "national consensus" against
executing offenders who were younger than
18 at the time of their crimes.
This implicitly repudiated a position
Kennedy had taken in 1989, when he joined
the court in upholding the practice. As
recently as 2003, he had voted to reinstate a
juvenile's death sentence that had been put
on hold by an appeals court.
This time, he buttressed his argument with
references to other countries' opposition to
the juvenile death penalty, drawing fire from
conservatives who saw him importing
foreign law into the interpretation of the
Constitution-as he had previously done in
striking down the sodomy laws.
Notably, Kennedy could have reached the
same result in the death penalty case without
making such references. "To add that
separate section is an example of Kennedy's
really declaring his independence from the
conservative orthodoxy of originalism,"
Supreme Court litigator Paul Smith said at
the American Constitution Society forum.
On property rights, Kennedy supplied a fifth
vote to a four-member liberal bloc to uphold
local governments' right to buy out private
property when deemed necessary to promote
broader economic development.
The property rights activists who brought
the case had expected Kennedy's support,
based in part on his generally pro-property-
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rights record on the court.
And in the medical marijuana case, Kennedy
joined Scalia in breaking with a recent string
of cases in which they and the court's other
conservatives had struck down federal laws
on the grounds that they exceeded
Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce.
But whereas Scalia supplied a separate
opinion explaining how his positions then
and now could be reconciled, Kennedy
simply cast his vote without further
comment.
Even when Rehnquist had a majority
including Kennedy-as he did in upholding
a six-foot stone monument of the Ten
Commandments on the Texas Capitol
grounds-it was a shallow victory.
The fifth vote in his coalition came not from
someone who agreed with his long-standing
view that the commandments are generally
permissible on government property, but
from Justice Stephen G. Breyer, who
accepted the monument on the much
narrower basis that it had not aroused much
controversy during its four-decade stay in
Austin.
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"Under the Microscope Longer than Most"
New York Times
July 10, 2005
Linda Greenhouse
The period during which a court's
membership remains unchanged is known to
political scientists as a natural court. It is
useful as a kind of controlled experiment
that permits study of the institution itself
without the distraction of judges coming and
going. Or so the theory goes.
With Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's
announced retirement, one particular natural
court, an unusually long-lived one, is
coming to an end. The experiment has run
its course: put nine justices together, add a
healthy mix of some of the most challenging
and contested issues of the day, and wait 11
years. Glance inside occasionally and find
various revolutions in progress, portending
major changes in federalism, religion and
property rights.
But what finally emerged was something
quite different: not revolutionary change but,
in the end, continuity. In the interim, the
period was dynamic, even tumultuous, but
by the time it was over, the revolutions had
fizzled or run their course, and the fervor
appeared to have died. To the extent that
there was basic change, it was to the left
rather than the right: a firmer foundation for
affirmative action, a constitutional
framework for gay rights.
The challenge is to understand what
happened. To the degree that it can be
explained, the experience of this natural
court might prove useful in predicting the
nature of the next one, or at least in
suggesting those attributes in a new justice
that might be most likely to change the
closely divided court, or to keep it running
on the same course.
Many factors influence the court at any
given moment. One is the quality of
interaction among justices on a court where
little can be accomplished without five
votes. Another is the flow of cases and the
issues they bring to the court's door. Still
another, often too little appreciated, is the
reality check the court receives from the
lower courts that have to interpret and apply
its decisions.
But the essential building blocks remain the
individual justices themselves: not their
resumes or even necessarily their records,
but their own sense of identity and place in
the mix of law, history and politics that is
always swirling around the court.
"Sandra O'Connor temperamentally came
out of the mainstream of American society,
and that's true of this court as a whole," Paul
Gewirtz, a professor at Yale Law School,
said the other day. "This court has seen
itself as not basically challenging American
society as it found it."
Professor Gewirtz said that candidates for
the court who "self-identify as critics of the
court" are least likely to be changed by the
experience of serving there, while "those
who feel themselves connected to the basic
trajectory of American law remain open to
observing changes in society."
The first category is exemplified by Justices
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas as well
as by Robert H. Bork, whose failed Supreme
Court nomination in 1987 was a watershed
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event from which the political system has
yet to recover. Their "originalist"
jurisprudence starts from the premise that in
the hands of the modem Supreme Court, the
world has fallen away from the ideal-the
Constitution as written by its framers-and
their mission is to recover that world to the
extent possible.
The Supreme Court's "combination of
absolute power, disdain for the historic
Constitution and philosophical
incompetence is lethal," Mr. Bork wrote last
week in The Wall Street Journal.
On the other hand, a brief essay that Justice
O'Connor wrote in 1992, on the threshold of
the period just ended, offers dramatic
evidence of how service on the court can
change another kind of judge. It was a
tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, who
had retired the previous year. During their
10 years of service together, Justice
Marshall had influenced her "profoundly,"
Justice O'Connor wrote in The Stanford Law
Review. The stories he told from his life
spoke to her of "the power of moral truth"
and had the capacity to "perhaps change the
way I see the world."
These were surprising words from a
conservative justice whose jurisprudence, at
the time, showed few traces of Justice
Marshall's influence. Nor did she
necessarily offer her words as prophecy.
But to a degree that few would have
predicted at the time, they came true.
Thurgood Marshall had been dead more than
10 years by the time a noticeably different
Sandra Day O'Connor wrote the court's
majority opinion in 2003 upholding
affirmative action in university admissions.
The discomfort on the right with the
prospect that President Bush might name his
attorney general, Alberto R. Gonzales, to
succeed Justice O'Connor stems from the
fear that he, too, fits in the second category
rather than the first. "The impression many
conservatives have is that Gonzales is
conventional in his legal thinking and
unlikely to repair to first principles were he
on the court," Terry Eastland wrote last
week in the conservative Weekly Standard,
calling for the attorney general to "take his
name off the list for the Supreme Court."
Scholars looking for explanations for the last
11 years point as well to the influence that
the lower federal courts exert on the
Supreme Court. It is the lower courts that
have to make sense of the Supreme Court's
opinions and to apply them in new factual
contexts. "It's a feedback loop," said
Suzanna Sherry, a professor at Vanderbilt
University Law School. "You see how your
opinions are actually working. You see the
problems they create. This court has
signaled very clearly that it wanted to move
in particular directions. Some of the lower
courts took those directions and went
further."
The feedback process may account for the
Supreme Court's tacking back to the center
in death penalty cases in the last several
years. For example, a majority of the court
had indicated quite forcefully that in
evaluating habeas corpus petitions from
death row inmates, federal judges should
grant more deference to the conclusions of
the state courts. But "deference does not
imply abandonment or abdication of judicial
review," Justice Anthony M. Kennedy said
for the court in a 2003 case that ordered a
hearing for a Texas death row inmate whose
petition a federal appeals court had
dismissed, Eight justices joined that
majority opinion, with Justice Thomas the
only dissenter.
"People have agendas, but one of the
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beauties of the court is that it has to shape
itself around a set of facts in each case," said
James J. Brudney, a law professor at Ohio
State University.
Even if Chief Justice Rehnquist, 80 years
old and ill with thyroid cancer, is on the
bench when the next term begins, it would
be no surprise if President Bush soon had
another vacancy to fill. Far from lasting 11
years, the next natural court would then be
measured in months, hardly long enough to
solve the mysteries of the last one. The new
court, too, will have its mysteries. "Every
time a new justice comes to the Supreme
Court, it's a different court," Justice Byron
R. White, who served 31 years, liked to say.
"It's a new instrument."
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"Center Court"
New York Times
June 12, 2005
Jeffrey Rosen
Within hours of the compromise reached by
a bipartisan group of senators last month
that defused, or at least delayed, a
showdown on judicial filibusters, interest
groups on the right and the left were
denouncing the deal in the most aggrieved
terms. "Is there anybody on our side who is
happy?" Nan Aron, president of the liberal
Alliance for Justice, told The Times. Paul
Weyrich, founder of the conservative Free
Congress Foundation, was even angrier
about the deal. "Conservatives are going to
be outraged over it," he predicted.
Yet even as interest groups were bemoaning
the fact that a handful of centrists had
narrowly prevented the Senate from blowing
itself up, the country as a whole was
applauding the compromise. An
independent poll conducted by Quinnipiac
University found that 55 percent of
respondents thought the filibuster should be
used to keep unfit judges off the bench, as
opposed to 36 percent who thought it should
not. Moreover, the country seemed less
worried about partisan judges than about
partisan senators and representatives. In the
days before the deal, a CBS News poll
found that 68 percent of respondents said
that Congress "does not have the same
priorities for the country" as they do. By
contrast, the Quinnipiac poll found that a 44
percent plurality approved of the way the
Supreme Court is handling its job.
Put another way, it would seem that, on
balance, the views of a majority of
Americans are more accurately represented
by the moderate majority on the Supreme
Court, led in recent years by Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, than by the polarized party
leadership in the Senate, led by Bill Frist
and Harry Reid. Congressional Republicans
and Democrats are pandering to their bases,
wooing conservative or liberal interest
groups that care intensely about judicial
nominations because they're upset about the
current direction of the Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, the country as a whole seems to
be relatively happy with the court and
appears to have no interest in paralyzing the
federal government over a confirmation
battle that would do little to affect the court's
overall balance-a battle that is likely to
take place this summer if Chief Justice
William Rehnquist steps down.
How did we get to this odd moment in
American history, when unelected Supreme
Court justices are expressing the views of
popular majorities more faithfully than the
people's elected representatives? The most
obvious culprit is partisan gerrymandering.
In the 2000 elections, 98.5 percent of
Congressional incumbents won their races
definitively (75 percent of them by more
than 20 percentage points), thanks to
increasingly sophisticated computer
technology that makes it possible to draw
House districts in which incumbents are
guaranteed easy re-election simply by
catering to their ideological bases. As a
result, Democrats and Republicans in
Congress no longer have an incentive to
court the moderate center in general
elections. This, in turn, has created parties
that are more polarized than at any other
point in the past 50 years. And since more
than half of the current senators previously
served as representatives, the radically
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partisan culture of the House is now
contaminating the Senate.
In the 90's, around the same time that
partisan gerrymandering began to divide
Congress into armed camps, the Supreme
Court moved in a different direction. Under
O'Connor's moderate leadership, the court
became increasingly adept at representing
the more accommodating center of
American politics. O'Connor, a former
Arizona state legislator, has contributed to a
series of compromise opinions in cases
involving affirmative action, indirect
government aid to religion, gay rights and
abortion-all of which, in one way or
another, seemed to split the difference
between right and left. In reaffirming Roe v.
Wade in 1992, for instance, the court
emphasized that early-term abortions had to
be protected but that late-term ones could be
restricted-a position embraced by two-
thirds of the country but rejected by interest
groups on both the left and right.
This isn't to say that the court is always in
lockstep with public opinion: sometimes the
court ratifies a strong national sentiment
(striking down an obsolete state ban on
contraceptives), and sometimes it stakes out
a position that the public subsequently
embraces (striking down school
segregation). But whether the moderate
justices on the Rehnquist court are self-
consciously reading the polls, neutrally
interpreting the Constitution or trying to
compensate for other polarities in the
political system, their high-profile decisions
have been consistently popular with
majorities (or at least pluralities) of the
American public.
In other words, the conservative interest
groups have it exactly backward. Their
standard charge is that unelected judges are
thwarting the will of the people by
overturning laws passed by elected
representatives. But in our new topsy-turvy
world, it's the elected representatives who
are thwarting the will of the people, which is
being channeled instead by unelected
judges.
Clearly, this is not an ideal situation. If
O'Connor were still a legislator, she could
be applauded for her moderation and
political savvy, but Supreme Court justices
are not supposed to align with the opinion
polls more reliably than the Senate majority
leader. Since judges are increasingly acting
as political representatives of the people, it's
not surprising that they are increasingly
attacked in political terms. Consider the
recent wave of judge bashing by
Congressional Republicans, who accused
judges of impeding the will of the people in
the Terri Schiavo case. Never mind that in
that case, it was actually the state and
federal judges, rather than Congressional
Republicans, whose decisions comported
with the views of a majority of the public.
The fact that politicians now feel
emboldened to attack judges with whom
they disagree suggests that the polarization
in Congress may be threatening the public's
respect for judges as neutral arbiters of the
law.
Is there any way out of this mess? The
filibuster deal is only a stopgap solution that
may briefly calm, but can't change, the
political dynamics that have radicalized
Congress. And of course Congress is
unlikely to eliminate partisan
gerrymandering on its own, since
incumbents will go to great lengths to
preserve the partisan districting schemes that
guarantee their re-elections.
The only institution that might, in theory,
save American democracy from its most
polarizing and antidemocratic tendencies
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is-paradoxically enough-the Supreme
Court. Some scholars have urged the court
to impose on the nation a system in which
electoral districts are drawn by nonpartisan
commissions rather than partisan state
legislators. But last year, the Supreme Court
rejected the invitation because the justices
couldn't agree on how much political
competition the Constitution requires. (And
just as well, too: the court's ill-advised
intervention in Bush v. Gore shows the
dangers of judicial efforts to save the nation
from intractable political disputes. When
judges invent novel constitutional principles
to remove politics from the democratic
process, half the country is likely to suspect
them as a pretext for partisanship.)
One way to forestall a potential crisis of
democracy is the kind of compromise
represented by the filibuster deal, which
might produce the more centrist Supreme
Court nominees that the public generally
prefers. But this won't cure the polarization
of politics that has inflated the Supreme
Court's importance in the first place.
Moreover, the filibuster deal could well
collapse, in which case the president and
Congress may try to push the courts toward
the extreme right to please their base. If
they succeed, the Supreme Court, over the
long term, could become just as much in the
thrall of ideological extremists as the White
House and Congress. And then the views of
a majority of the American public might not
be represented by any of the three branches
of the United States government-an
alarming prospect for the world's leading
democracy.
If Rehnquist retires later this month, the
character of the court is unlikely to change
significantly; his replacement will probably
be about as conservative as he is. But if and
when O'Connor or a more liberal justice
retires, the stakes will be far greater. The
fact that the center in American politics has
to look to Justice O'Connor rather than to
Congress to represent its views suggests
dangers for both parties down the road. If
Congressional Republicans and Democrats
repeatedly put the wishes of their bases
above the wishes of the public, a provoked
national majority may eventually try to
throw them out. And if unable to do so
because of gerrymandered districts, that
majority may be mobilized to elect more
moderate politicians by popular initiative, as
California voters essentially did in choosing
Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger. Indeed,
Schwarzenegger is now trying to ensure that
other moderates like himself can be elected.
In January, he proposed to replace
California's partisan districting system with
nonpartisan districting by retired judges,
Maybe what's happened in California is the
only way to empower the silent majority of
Americans to take back their country.
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"The Year Rehnquist May Have Lost His Court"
New York Times
July 5, 2004
Linda Greenhouse
Although it has been 10 years since its
membership last changed, the Supreme
Court that concluded its term last week was,
surprisingly and in important ways, a new
court.
It is too soon to say for sure, but it is
possible that the 2003-4 term may go down
in history as the one when Chief Justice
William -1. Rehnquist lost his court.
The cases decided in the term's closing days
on the rights of the detainees labeled "enemy
combatants" by the Bush administration
provided striking evidence for this appraisal.
The court ruled that foreigners imprisoned at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as well as
American citizens held in the United States
are entitled to contest their classification
before an impartial judge.
The surprise lay not in the outcome: it was
scarcely a great shock, except perhaps to the
administration, that a court preoccupied in
recent years with preserving judicial
authority would reject the bold claim of
unreviewable executive power at the core of
the administration's legal arguments.
Rather, what was most unexpected about the
outcome of the cases was the invisibility of
Chief Justice Rehnquist.
It is a remarkable development. Since his
promotion to chief justice 18 years ago, his
tenure has been notable for the sure hand
with which he has led the court, marshaling
fractious colleagues not only to advance his
own agenda but also to protect the court's
institutional prerogatives.
Four years ago, for example, the court
reviewed a law by which Congress had
purported to overrule the Miranda decision,
a precedent Chief Justice Rehnquist disliked
and had criticized for years. But in the face
of Congress's defiance, he wrote a cryptic
opinion for a 7-to-2 majority that said no
more than necessary about Miranda itself
but found common ground in making clear
that it was the court, not Congress, that has
the last word on what the Constitution
means.
This year, there was every reason to suppose
the chief justice would want to shape the
court's response to the war on terrorism. His
1998 book on the history of civil liberties in
wartime reflected his extensive knowledge
and evident fascination with the subject by
which the term, if not his entire tenure, was
likely to be known. If there was a message
to be delivered from one branch of
government to another, Chief Justice
Rehnquist figured to be the one to deliver it.
Yet the Guantanamo case found him silently
joining Justice Antonin Scalia's dissenting
opinion as Justice John Paul Stevens
explained for the 6-to-3 majority why the
federal courts have jurisdiction to review the
status of the hundreds of foreigners detained
there.
In the case of Yaser Esam Hamdi, the
American-born Saudi taken from the
battlefield in Afghanistan and held since
2002 in a military prison, Chief Justice
Rehnquist was among the eight justices who
found the open-ended detention improper
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for either constitutional or statutory reasons.
But his was not among the several voices
with which the court spoke. He was a silent
member-perhaps even a late-arriving
one-of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's
plurality opinion.
The implication is not that Chief Justice
Rehnquist, who turns 80 on Oct. 1, has lost a
step. Nor does he show any interest in
leaving the court, which he joined in 1972 at
the age of 47. A few days ago, in fact, he
hired law clerks for the term beginning in
October 2005, and some people believe he is
aiming to top the record of 36 years set by
Justice William 0. Douglas, or at least to
equal the 34-year tenure of his judicial hero,
Chief Justice John Marshall.
Rather, it appears that while he has stood
still, the court's center of gravity has moved
away from him. One statistic is particularly
telling. There were 18 cases this term
decided by five-member majorities (17 were
5-to-4 decisions and one, the Pledge of
Allegiance case, was 5 to 3 but would surely
have been 5 to 4 had Justice Scalia
participated; he would certainly have agreed
with Chief Justice Rehnquist, in the
minority, that the court should rule that
"under God" posed no constitutional
problem). Of the 18 cases, Chief Justice
Rehnquist was in the majority in only eight.
That contrasts sharply with the chief
justice's notably successful term two years
ago, when he was in the majority in 15 of 21
5-to-4 decisions. A year ago, he was in the
majority half the time, in 7 of 14 cases with
5-to-4 votes, and was on the losing side in
the most important of those cases, the
decision that upheld affirmative action at the
University of Michigan. He was also on the
losing side in the Texas gay rights case, in
which the court voted 6 to 3 to overturn the
state's criminal sodomy law.
Those were the first stirrings of what
accelerated during the term that began Oct.
6. The chief justice was in dissent in most
major cases, from the expedited ruling in
December that upheld major provisions of
the new campaign finance law, until the two
decisions last Tuesday, the term's final day,
blocking enforcement of an Internet
pornography law and taking a generous view
of federal court jurisdiction under the Alien
Tort Statute to hear foreign human rights
cases. Also last week, he dissented from the
court's refusal to authorize a police
interrogation tactic designed to induce
suspects to confess despite receiving their
Miranda warnings.
Further, the Rehnquist court's federalism
revolution, with its expansive approach to
state sovereignty and correspondingly
limited view of Congressional power,
appeared this term to stall in its tracks. The
chief justice was on the losing side in the
term's major federalism case, the 5-to-4
decision in Tennessee v. Lane rejecting state
immunity from suit under a provision of the
Americans With Disabilities Act.
A number of other cases had federalism
overtones that a majority of the court either
rejected or ignored. In the case that struck
down the sentencing guidelines in the state
of Washington, Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy objected in dissent that the court
was failing to give the states proper respect
for their legislative choices on criminal
justice. Chief Justice Rehnquist also
dissented in that case, which although just
over a week old has already left criminal
sentencing in turmoil around the country.
Opponents of the McCain-Feingold
campaign finance law objected on state's
rights grounds to limits on the fund-raising
abilities of political parties at the state level.
In upholding the law, over Chief Justice
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Rehnquist's dissent, the court barely
acknowledged the federalism argument.
The chief justice tried and failed to use a
Pennsylvania redistricting case this term to
overturn a 1986 precedent, to which he had
strongly objected at the time, that gave
courts authority to review claims of partisan
gerrymandering. While there were five
votes to reject the particular gerrymander
complaint, one of the five, Justice Kennedy,
refused to go along completely, instead
writing a concurring opinion that kept the
prospect of a successful gerrymander suit
alive for future cases.
The court decided 73 cases with full
opinions during the term. Of the major
cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the
majority opinion in two. One was the third
of the terrorism detainee cases, that of Jose
Padilla, an American arrested at O'Hare
International Airport in Chicago on
suspicion of being part of a terrorist plot,
who has been held in a military prison for
the last two years without access to court.
The decision postponed resolution of the
case by holding that Mr. Padilla's lawyer
should have filed his habeas corpus petition
in South Carolina rather than in New York.
The second of the chief justice's major
opinions came in an important church-state
case, Locke v. Davey. The question was
whether a state that underwrites college
scholarships for secular study must also
subsidize students who want to study for the
ministry. The argument for the religious
subsidies built on Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion for the court two years ago in a
school voucher case from Ohio, holding that
it did not violate the Constitution for states
to give parents vouchers for religious school
tuition as part of a general "school choice"
plan.
As a practical matter, the future of the
school-choice movement depended on the
answer to the question Locke v. Davey
brought to the court: if vouchers were
permissible, were they also constitutionally
required? Writing for a 7-to-2 majority, the
chief justice's answer was no. "The state has
merely chosen not to fund a distinct
category of instruction," one that was "not
fungible" with ordinary secular studies, he
said over biting dissents from Justices Scalia
and Clarence Thomas.
Largely overlooked in the drama of the
term's higher-profile cases, Locke v. Davey
was an important decision, indicative of the
struggle now going on within the court over
how far to push some of the principles that
the conservative majority has established
over the last 10 years or so.
In this instance, although the consequences
of turning permissible vouchers into
required vouchers would have been
profoundly unsettling, the court's recent
insistence on an equal place for religion at
the public table provided at least a plausible
basis for that outcome. Instead, the majority
looked at the consequences of carrying the
recent precedents to their logical conclusion,
and stopped short.
In fact, as Locke v. Davey demonstrates, the
most consequential debate on the court
today may be not so much over first
principles, but over how far to carry those
principles. That the chief justice was so
often on the losing side this term may not
mean that those who once agreed with him
have changed their minds, but that they
disagree over what to do next.
In Locke v. Davey, the stopping point
appeared clear to a broad majority of the
court. In the Tennessee federalism case, by
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contrast, while the chief justice wanted to
continue pressing the boundaries of state
sovereignty to immunize the state from a
lawsuit by a man who could not reach a
second-floor county courtroom in his
wheelchair, Justice O'Connor decided that
Tennessee v. Lane was not the case in which
to push sovereign immunity to its logical
conclusion.
The outcome was reminiscent of the court's
decision a year ago in the Michigan
affirmative action case. Justice O'Connor,
long skeptical of all official policies that
take account of race, joined Justices Stevens,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David H. Souter and
Stephen G. Breyer to uphold the law
school's admissions plan, essentially on the
ground that diversity was good for the
country.
Pragmatism rather than doctrine seems to be
the order of the day at the court now.
Justice O'Connor, perhaps the court's
leading pragmatist, cast only five dissenting
votes in the entire term, far fewer than
anyone else, and was in the majority in 13 of
the 18 most closely decided cases, more
often than any other justice. She formed
strategic alliances with other justices, for
example writing an unusual joint opinion
with Justice Stevens that upheld the central
portions of the campaign finance law.
Justice Stevens displayed his own strategic
skills, finely honed during a 29-year tenure
that has made him the senior associate
justice, in a position to assign the majority
opinion in all cases where the chief justice is
in dissent. He tailored his majority opinion
in Tennessee v. Lane to Justice O'Connor's
comfort level, for example, and crafted a
procedural opinion that removed the highly
sensitive Pledge of Allegiance case from the
court's docket with surgical precision,
leaving no precedent behind. At 84, his
intellectual energy appears undimmed, and
he told a gathering of his former law clerks a
few weeks ago that he has no retirement
plans.
So when the new term begins on Oct. 4, the
same justices will reassemble for a highly
unusual 11th year together. The juvenile
death penalty and medical marijuana are
among the cases already on a docket that
may continue pushing these nine people, so
familiar to each other, in new directions.
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"The Rehnquist Court"
National Journal
May 21, 2005
Stuart Taylor, Jr.
Justice William Brennan Jr. was in an
animated mood, even for him. It was May
27, 1987, toward the end of the Supreme
Court's first term since Justice William
Rehnquist's 1986 promotion to chief justice.
The Senate vote had been 65-33, amid bitter
attacks-even charges of perjury-from
liberal groups.
Long the Court's leading liberal, Brennan
was sharing with this reporter his assessment
(confidential, until now) of the new chief
justice, who had long been its leading
conservative.
"He's the reason the opinions are coming
down faster," enthused Brennan. "He's just
been a breath of fresh air. He's so damned
personable. No more listening to long
harangues in criminal cases [during the
Court's private conferences]. He lays his
position out, casts his vote. You know
exactly where he stands in every god
damned case. And he's meticulously fair in
assigning opinions. I can't begin to tell you
how much better all of us feel . . . and how
fond all of us are of him personally."
Rehnquist's predecessor, Warren Burger-
known for long harangues and a less-than
fair approach to assigning opinions-had
been an easy act to follow. ("If one's in the
doghouse with the chief," Justice Harry
Blackmun once said of his former best
friend Burger, "he gets the crud.") But the
affection and respect for Rehnquist among
his colleagues, then and now, is nonetheless
striking.
Echoing Brennan's praise of Rehnquist to
this reporter a few weeks later, Justice Lewis
Powell Jr. added: "In many ways, he's the
best-educated person I've ever worked with,
very familiar with the classics. He'll quote
them at conference. Everybody agrees
generally, I suppose, that he's brilliant, but
he has a good sense of humor, and he's very
generous, and he is principled."
Thurgood Marshall, Brennan's liberal ally
on the Court, later called Rehnquist "a great
chief justice." This from the man who had
been the NAACP's lead lawyer in Brown v.
Board of Education-and about the man
once assailed by liberals for having written
in 1952 that the Court should uphold
segregated schools and a few months later
that it was "about time that the Court faced
the fact that the white people in the South
don't like the colored people." Not to
mention Rehnquist's subsequent advice to
Sen. Barry Goldwater to vote against the
1964 Civil Rights Act.
"[T]he legacy of the Rehnquist Court,"
Walter Dellinger, a leading scholar who was
acting solicitor general in the Clinton
administration, has said, "is going to be
judicial supremacy and a willingness to set
aside the judgments of the other branches of
government."
How Good a Chief Justice?
How will history rate Rehnquist? Putting
aside what one thinks of his brand of
conservatism, the question can be divided
into five categories:
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1. Has he persuaded his fractious colleagues
to come together in the big cases in ways
that enhance public understanding of and
respect for the Court?
2. Has he has persuaded any of them to
move closer to his own brand of
conservatism?
3. How impressive are his opinions,
dissents, and concurrences as a body of
work?
4. Has he led the justices to work hard and
effectively at their often unglamorous job of
resolving conflicts among lower courts and
of fostering clarity and consistency in the
law?
5. Has he succeeded in his modest
aspiration, voiced in his 1986 confirmation
hearing, to foster a "smoothly functioning
Court?"
"No chief justice in history has ever gone
down as a great one who didn't succeed in
massing the Court," Justice Brennan told
this reporter in July 1988, in another
conversation about Rehnquist.
"Massing the Court," Brennan had
previously explained, refers to "the
extraordinary responsibility that falls on the
shoulders of the chief justice to come as
close as we can to unanimity," so that the
Court's decrees will be "more readily
accepted." The leading example is Earl
Warren's successful campaign to win over
doubtful colleagues to make unanimous his
ground-shaking 1954 ruling against school
segregation in Brown.
During Rehnquist's second term as chief
justice, which had ended a few days before
this reporter's July 1988 conversation with
Brennan, Rehnquist had written two quite
surprising opinions for the Court, both of
them applauded by liberals, and both of
them textbook examples of "massing the
Court."
In Hustler v. Falwell, a unanimous Court
reversed a $200,000 jury award for
"intentional infliction of emotional distress"
to television evangelist Jerry Falwell against
Hustler magazine, which had run a savage,
ribald parody of him and his mother.
Rehnquist endorsed and extended a line of
decisions-beginning with Brennan's own
landmark 1964 opinion in New York Times
v. Sullivan-designed to give "breathing
space" to First Amendment freedoms by
curbing libel suits. This from the same
Rehnquist who had consistently rejected
such First Amendment defenses in the past
and had said that Sullivan "should be
reconsidered."
In Morrison v. Olson, Rehnquist wrote a
landmark decision for a 7-1 majority (with
Scalia dissenting) upholding the now-lapsed
federal law providing for judicial
appointment of independent counsels to
investigate possible high-level crimes. This
was a stunning rebuff to the Reagan
administration and its claim of exclusive
presidential power over prosecutions.
Brennan was especially enthusiastic, and not
only because he strongly agreed with these
two opinions. Brennan was also "anxious
for [Rehnquist] to have a career ranking
with [the] great chief justices," he said. And
he was cautiously hopeful that Rehnquist
might be on his way. "His votes and
opinions in [those] cases are not the way you
would have expected him to vote, and not
the kind of opinions you would have
expected him to write a couple years ago,"
Brennan said. "He senses . . . that he, as
chief justice, has an obligation to
accommodate his views to those of the
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majority when he can. And if that's what's
happening, it's terribly important."
A Chief With No Followers
For the most part, however, Rehnquist has
voted with Scalia and Thomas, often in
dissent. And the Rehnquist Court has been
known less for "massing" than for deep
liberal-conservative divisions and for
splintering, in many cases, into three or four
camps.
The paradigm of a splintered, badly written
decision that fostered public confusion and
disrespect for the Court was Bush v. Gore,
which spurred a storm of charges that the
justices had let partisan politics trump their
own legal principles.
In short, regardless of whether the outcome
was correct, the opinions were a mess. But
in fairness, it's unclear whether anyone
could have done what Rehnquist failed to
do: unite more than a bare majority of the
justices behind a clear and credible opinion.
And, in what was widely seen as an implicit
defense of the decision on pragmatic
grounds, Rehnquist said in a speech less
than a month after the decision that
sometimes "there is a national crisis, and
only you can avert it."
Other conspicuous examples of Rehnquist's
inability to mass the Court were last June's
decisions rejecting two sweeping Bush
administration claims of wartime executive
power. . ..
Surely Rehnquist, who had written a 1998
book on the history of civil liberties in
wartime. must have wanted a central role in
these, the biggest wartime civil-liberties
cases in more than 50 years. Yet he wrote
nothing. He joined O'Connor's plurality
opinion in Hamdi, which produced four
opinions, none for a majority, that raised
more questions than they answered. And he
was simply a name on Scalia's dissent in the
Guantanamo case, in which Stevens wrote a
majority opinion so cryptic as to mystify
lower courts about what to do next.
None of this necessarily proves that
Rehnquist's powers of persuasion are
inferior to Warren's. Brown, in which
unanimity was far more critical to the
Court's credibility than in any decision
since, was highly exceptional. The vast
majority of the justices in recent history
have been "as independent as hogs on ice,"
as Rehnquist once said. And it would be
hard to identify many (if any) big cases in
the past 50 years in which Rehnquist or any
other chief justice has successfully "massed
the Court" in the same way that Warren did
in Brown: not by modifying his own views,
but by persuading doubtful colleagues to
modify theirs.
In this sense, the symbolic prominence of
Rehnquist or any other chief justice is vastly
out of proportion to his actual power. The
chief has only one vote. That's why the
liberals and conservatives preparing for the
mother of all confirmation battles (sooner or
later) know that the Court's future will
depend much less on who becomes the next
chiefjustice than on who comes in from the
outside.
Doing Less Justice
Rehnquist-or, at least, the Rehnquist
Court-gets low marks from some critics on
the subject of fostering consistency and
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clarity in the law. The main reason is that
the Court has slashed the number of cases it
decides.
The number of signed opinions has plunged
from 147 in the 1985-86 term to 73 in the
2003-04 term. The Court now grants review
in only a fraction of 1 percent of its annual
flood of some 8,000 petitions for certiorari.
("Cert petitions" are requests that the Court
hear and decide appeals on the merits; they
include roughly 6,000 almost invariably
frivolous petitions prepared by indigents.)
This trend has left more conflicts among
lower courts unresolved. Experts disagree
on whether that is a bad thing.
"The justices inexplicably have decided not
to do as much as the taxpayers pay them to
do," wrote Philip A. Lacovara, a prominent
lawyer who has argued 17 cases before the
Court, in a statistic-laden December 2003
commentary in The American Lawyer.
"This is a shockingly low-performance
record. . . . Throughout most of its history,
the Court addressed important issues of
federal commercial law. . . . Now [it]
disdains ordinary commercial law issues as
unworthy of the justices' time."
But a longtime observer of the Court's work
(who requests anonymity) disputes the
notion that the justices are passing over lots
of cases that they should review. "The
Court doesn't have to decide every case
about spitting on the sidewalk," this
observer says. He adds that much of the
drop in signed opinions since 1986 is
attributable to a 1988 law abolishing the
requirement that the Court hear "mandatory
appeals" in certain classes of cases, most of
which the justices considered a waste of
their time.
The decline in signed opinions is also
related to the Court's ever more cursory
review of each cert petition. Brennan used
to read them all personally, and other
justices would at least assign a law clerk to
summarize each petition. But over the past
15 years, all but Justice John Paul Stevens
have joined the so-called "cert pool." This
pool delegates to a single, shared clerk the
duties of eight justices to evaluate each
petition.
"Eight of the justices rely primarily on that
single pool memorandum in deciding
whether to grant review," Lacovara
explained. This helps shrink the Court's
docket. Twenty-something clerks may not
be captivated by important but unsexy
commercial or regulatory disputes. They
may also err on the side of recommending
denial of review, because they risk serious
embarrassment if they suggest a full review
of a case that the justices later decide was
inconsequential,
Does the Court use the time saved by
deciding fewer cases to improve its opinions
in those few? No, wrote Lacovara, and
many other Court-watchers would agree.
Indeed, many decisions have been muddied
by increasing prolixity and by the
proliferation of separate concurring,
dissenting, and mixed concurring-and-
dissenting opinions.
How hard do the justices work, now that
their caseload is smaller-and now that the
eight oldest range in age from 65 to 85?
The Judgment of History
Is Rehnquist a great chief justice? That
depends on what the meaning of "great" is.
He has zealously guarded the Court's
prerogatives in his push for judicial
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enforcement of states' rights against
Congress, in Dickerson, in Bush v. Gore,
and in some other cases. Perhaps that's part
of a chief justice's job. But in the process,
the Rehnquist Court has carried on the
relentless expansion of judicial power that
has spawned so many conservative attacks
since the 1950s, including Rehnquist's own
early criticisms of the Warren Court.
At the same time, the Rehnquist Court has
not come close to speaking with a clear or
cogent voice-let alone with unanimity or
near-unanimity-in many of the biggest
cases. But it's doubtful that any chief justice
could have done much better on that score,
given the independence and fractiousness of
the other justices and the unheroic, polarized
temper of the times.
The justices' dramatic cutbacks in the time
that they (and their clerks) spend screening
cert petitions, and in the number of full
decisions that they issue, have made life
easier for them. But such reductions have
also left the law less clear than it could be
and lower courts with less guidance than
before Rehnquist became chief justice.
On balance, a mixed record. Perhaps,
however, Rehnquist should be assessed
primarily in terms of the criteria most within
the chief justice's control: his own opinions
and dissents; his success in winning the
esteem of colleagues; his efficiency in
administering the Court's business; his
effectiveness in presiding over oral
arguments and other public sessions; his
expediting of discussion in the Court's
conferences; and his assigning of opinions
fairly.
Rehnquist's opinions don't draw praise from
scholars as models of judicial craftsmanship,
consistency, or candor. But neither did Earl
Warren's. Or Warren Burger's. As to the
other criteria, Rehnquist has led the Court
(as he presided over the Clinton
impeachment trial) with efficiency, dignity,
and appropriate seriousness, punctuated by
dollops of his humor. He is "a regular guy,"
in the words of his former clerk Charles
Cooper, "in addition to being a damned
genius."
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"The Rehnquist Revolution"
The New Republic
January 10, 2005
Cass R. Sunstein
A review of: A Court Divided. The
Rehnquist Court and the Future of
Constitutional Lai, by Mark Tushnet
(W.W. Norton, 384 pp., $27.95).
. . . In its first seventy-five years, the
Supreme Court struck down only two acts of
Congress. In the eighteen years since
Ronald Reagan nominated William H.
Rehnquist as chief justice, the Court has
invalidated more than three dozen. Under
Rehnquist, the Court has compiled a record
of judicial activism that is, in some ways,
without parallel in the nation's history. Its
most controversial majority opinions have
usually been produced by its two moderate
conservatives, Sandra Day O'Connor and
Anthony Kennedy, and its three more
extreme conservatives, Rehnquist, Antonin
Scalia, and Clarence Thomas.
Rehnquist is now extremely ill, and it is
widely rumored that he will be leaving the
Supreme Court soon. An unfailingly
gracious and generous man, Rehnquist must
be counted as one of the giants of American
law, because he has presided over and
greatly contributed to a Supreme Court that
has radically revised previous
understandings of the Constitution. Since
joining the Court as associate justice in
1971, Rehnquist has had a clear agenda for
constitutional interpretation: to renew limits
on Congress's power under the commerce
clause, to increase the protection of private
property, to strike down affirmative action
programs, to scale back the use of the
Constitution to protect those accused of
crime, to reduce the protection of privacy, to
stop the use of the equal protection clause to
assist members of disadvantaged groups
(disabled people, the elderly, illegitimate
children, women), and much more. The
Rehnquist Court has not always acted in
accordance with the views of William
Rehnquist, but it has moved dramatically in
his preferred directions. What complicates
the picture is that O'Connor and Kennedy
have frequently insisted on caution. In some
cases, the result has been to lead the
Rehnquist Court to respect for precedent, to
restraint, and to a modest but unmistakable
degree of continuity with the rights-
protecting decisions of the Warren Court.
In Mark Tushnet's account, the division
between the two sets of conservatives on the
Court corresponds to a deeper division, one
that has played a large role in modern
American politics. O'Connor and Kennedy
represent the older and more traditional
wing of the Republican Party, and Scalia,
Thomas, and Rehnquist represent the
modem Republican Party as it has been
transformed by Barry Goldwater and Ronald
Reagan. The latter side of the party is far
more radical, for it rejects "the principles
that animated our government from the New
Deal through the Great Society." Tushnet
thinks that we have an emphatically
Republican Supreme Court whose majority
is split between the party's two wings.
In his view, the old Republicans on the
Supreme Court have worked with the new
ones to produce significant constitutional
change, above all by limiting the power of
the national government. But the new
Republicans, including the chief justice,
have been abandoned by the older ones on
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the social issues: thus the Court has refused
to move in radically conservative directions
on such issues as abortion, affirmative
action, gay rights, and the separation of
church and state. Tushnet's conclusion is
that "the Court's economic conservatives
won and its cultural conservatives lost."
And the reason is that in politics, too,
economic conservatives have been winning
and cultural conservatives have been losing.
The outcomes on the Rehnquist Court
reproduce the outcomes in the American
political process.
My own view is that the real divisions in the
Rehnquist Court involve two radically
different approaches to constitutional law.
In a nutshell: O'Connor and Kennedy are
incrementalists, reluctant to make large-
scale changes in existing understandings of
the law. Scalia, Thomas, and (to a lesser
extent) Rehnquist are legal fundamentalists,
or "movement judges," eager to insist on the
supremacy of their own view of the
Constitution, whatever the precedents say.
Most of the time, O'Connor and Kennedy
are certainly conservatives. But they tend to
decide cases one at a time. They respect
precedent, even when they disagree with it.
They do not want to revolutionize the law by
reference to first principles. They also show
some interest in public opinion, or in what
Kennedy has called "evolving social
values." Apparently they believe that the
Constitution's meaning changes over time;
and they think that evolving values play a
legitimate role in the interpretive process.
Hence, perhaps, their willingness to
invalidate laws that interfere with sexual
privacy and that discriminate against
women. In all these ways, O'Connor and
Kennedy are quintessential common-law
judges, distrustful of general theories and
broad rules, and willing to adjust the law to
new conditions and emerging principles.
Scalia and Thomas are altogether different.
(Rehnquist is generally with them, but he is
somewhat more cautious. In his early days
on the Court, he was a bit of a firebrand,
carrying out the role now associated with
Scalia; but as chief justice he has seemed
more moderate, perhaps because of the
requirements of his new role, perhaps
because the Court as a whole has moved far
to the right, and thus has often joined him.)
Scalia and Thomas are radicals, seeking to
make large-scale changes in constitutional
law. They are angry about existing law in a
way that O'Connor and Kennedy are not....
. . . For many admirers of Scalia and
Thomas, the real target now is Franklin
Delano Roosevelt, not Earl Warren. There
is increasing talk of restoring what is being
called the Constitution in Exile-the
Constitution as of 1932, Herbert Hoover's
Constitution, before Roosevelt's New Deal.
This was a period in which the Supreme
Court's understanding of the Constitution,
obviously rooted in the justices' political
convictions, jeopardized maximum-hour
legislation, minimum-wage legislation, the
National Labor Relations Act, the Fair
Labor Standards Act, and the Social
Security Act-and would certainly have
forbidden the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
Americans With Disabilities Act, and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
This was also a period in which racial
segregation was constitutionally fine, and in
which it would have been ludicrous to say
that the Constitution banned sex
discrimination or protected a right to sexual
and reproductive privacy.
The Bush administration does not lack
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sympathy for the Constitution in Exile, and
President Bush has nominated judges who
appear to believe that it should be restored.
Conservatives speak of "strict construction,"
but most of them do not practice it. Few are
willing to argue that judges should stay out
of the democratic arena. Bush v. Gore was a
far more radical intervention into political
processes than anything dared by the Warren
Court, and it is celebrated rather than
reviled. And Bush v. Gore is merely the
most visible of a long line of cases in which
the Rehnquist Court has seized on
ambiguous constitutional provisions to
invalidate decisions of Congress and state
governments.
Even in its aggressive moments, the
Rehnquist Court has not suggested that the
Constitution was properly understood by the
Supreme Court in 1932. But in limiting
national authority to protect disadvantaged
groups and in protecting property rights, it
has shown unmistakable sympathy for the
pre-New Deal Constitution. This is a
political program in legal dress. The harsh
irony is that the program has been advanced
especially aggressively by those members of
the Rehnquist Court who contend, and even
appear to believe, that they are speaking
neutrally for the Constitution.
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Will the chief justice of the United States,
William H. Rehnquist, retire when the
Supreme Court's term concludes at the end
of this month? Rehnquist's advanced age,
80, and recent treatments for thyroid cancer
make it seem more than likely that he will.
Yet, if anything, the chief justice seems to
have rallied in recent months, returning to
the bench to conduct oral arguments, writing
opinions and even reading some from the
bench, albeit with difficulty.
Whether Rehnquist leaves the court now or
later, he is probably in the twilight of a
remarkable and lengthy career. The
assessment of his impact on the law during
33 years on the court (more than 18 of them
as chief justice) has begun.
And though it is perhaps not the most
cheerful of subjects, one clear legacy of the
Rehnquist court is its contribution to
accelerating the pace of executions in the
United States.
The Rehnquist court, in tandem with
Congress, took some key steps during the
1980s and 1990s to reduce time-consuming
death row appeals. These appeals had
generally taken the form of petitions in
federal court for writs of habeas corpus,
based on alleged constitutional defects in a
particular defendant's trial.
Partly as a result, the number of executions
in the United States reached a modern
annual peak of 98 in 1999-before declining
to last year's total of 59.
Reducing death row litigation was
"something he cared about as much as
anything else," George Kendall, a longtime
capital defense lawyer based in New York,
said of Rehnquist. "He never thought the
federal courts should have this kind of
authority."
Indeed, when he was a law clerk for Justice
Robert H. Jackson in the early 1950s,
Rehnquist wrote disparaging memos about
what he saw as the overuse of federal habeas
corpus. Referring to the last-ditch appeals
of the convicted Soviet atomic spies, Julius
and Ethel Rosenberg, he wondered why "the
highest court of the nation must behave like
a bunch of old women every time they
encounter the death penalty."
But the Warren court of the 1950s and
1960s, concerned about the violations of
defendants' rights in the southern states'
courts, opened the door to fairly wide use of
federal habeas corpus by death row
prisoners. This contributed to a de facto end
of executions by 1967, even though juries
continued to sentence convicted murderers
to death. "Appeals, not public opinion, put a
temporary end to capital punishment in the
United States," University of California at
Los Angeles law professor Stuart Banner
observes in his book, The Death Penalty: An
American History.
The Supreme Court ended capital
punishment in 1972, only to approve its
reinstatement in 1976. But habeas corpus
appeals continued to stall executions-
excessively so in the view of Rehnquist.
"Of the hundreds of prisoners condemned to
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die who languish on the various 'death rows,'
few of them appear to face any imminent
prospect of their sentence being executed.
Indeed, in the five years since [capital
punishment's reinstatement] there has been
only one execution of a defendant who has
persisted in his attack upon his sentence,"
Rehnquist, then an associate justice, wrote in
a dissenting opinion. "I do not think that
this Court can continue to evade some
responsibility for this mockery of our
criminal justice system."
In 1988, the recently confirmed Chief
Justice Rehnquist formed the Ad Hoc
Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in
Capital Cases, and appointed retired justice
Lewis F. Powell Jr. as its chair. The
committee's 1989 report noted that "society
is rightfully entitled to have the penalty
prescribed by law carried out without
unreasonable delay."
In two subsequent decisions that Rehnquist
supported, 1989's Teague v. Lane, written by
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and 1991's
McCleskey v. Zant, written by Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy, the court sharply
restricted the rights of death row inmates to
ask federal courts for habeas corpus relief.
In 1996, Congress passed the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.
Signed by President Bill Clinton, it
incorporated the principles of the Powell
committee and the Rehnquist court's
decisions, and further tightened the limits on
multiple death row appeals. Rehnquist and
his fellow conservatives on the court
expedited constitutional review of the new
law. It was upheld in a unanimous ruling,
written by Rehnquist.
In his Jan. 1, 1998, annual report on the
federal judiciary, Rehnquist noted
approvingly: "As of June 1997, the number
of habeas corpus applications has fallen well
below the average number of monthly
filings during the 15 months prior to the
law's enactment in April 1996."
The debate over this aspect of Rehnquist's
record has already begun, and will
undoubtedly continue long after he has left
the scene.
Kendall said the chief justice would be
remembered for rolling back much-needed
"criminal justice reforms" of the Warren
court.
But Charles L. Hobson, a lawyer with the
Sacramento-based Criminal Justice Legal
Foundation, which backs prosecutors and
police in constitutional cases, praised
Rehnquist for helping put the will of pro-
death penalty voters and state legislators into
effect. "If you don't have executions, you
don't have capital punishment," Hobson
said.
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